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• What are experience goods? 
For many agricultural and food items, consumers 
cannot assess food quality until after consumption. 
In the economics and marketing literature, these  
goods are referred to as experience goods (Nelson,  
 
1970). When purchasing experience goods, con-
sumers search for quality cues to inform them 
about their product choice.  In this setting, produc-
ers’ reputations become important decision factors. 
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√ Reputations can be conceptualized as the expected 
quality which consumers associate to a product 
name before consuming it. 
√ Producers’ reputations play an important role 
when consumers are uncertain regarding product 
quality.  Firms with good reputation can charge a 
premium for their products, which can be consid-
ered as the cost of a quality insurance policy. 
√ Consumer’s willingness to pay for insurance var-
ies proportionally to the consequences  economi-
cal or other) associated with purchasing and con-
suming poor quality products. For consumers, col-
lecting information to form quality expectations is 
a costly activity.  Research costs reduce the mag-
nitude of the price premium which the reputation 
of a name can capture.  Thus, a firm may increase 




 to information regarding the quality of its prod-
ucts. 
√ Names can nest within each other, each one with 
its own reputation, to identify products with     
increasing specificity.  In the wine market, reputa-
tions may exist for Country of Origin, Viticultural 
Area, and winery names.  Reputations  associated 
with specific names are more precise, but also  
entail higher research costs on the consumer side.  
Less specific, collective names are often shared 
among numerous firms, and thus good (or devel-
oping) reputations may be endangered by free-
riding behavior. 
√ Reputation price premia are strongly correlated to 
producers’ historical performance, such as the 
number of years a name has been in the market, its 
historical average quality, and its quality consis-
tency. 
Summary of Research  Findings 
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• What are reputations? 
 We can think of reputations as the expected quality 
which, on average, consumers associate to a par-
ticular experience good before consuming it. Con-
sumers may use multiple sources of information to 
form quality expectations (e.g. previous experi-
ence, word of mouth, product reviews in special-
ized magazines, advertisement, etc).  The reliabil-
ity of quality information and the cost of obtaining 
it (research cost henceforth) vary depending on the 
source(s) chosen. 
 
• Why are reputations important for producers?  
Research shows (Costanigro et al., 2007 and 2009) 
that producers with good reputations can earn a 
price premium for their products, even when the 
characteristics of the products sold are comparable 
to those of lower reputation producers.  We can 
think of this premium as the price of an insurance 
policy certifying the quality of a product to con-
sumers.  While most consumers are willing to pay 
a positive amount to insure against poor quality, 
forming quality expectations is a costly (in terms 
of time or money)   activity for consumers.  Thus, 
reputation price premia amount to what consumers 
are willing to pay for quality insurance net of the 
research costs (Costanigro et al., 2009a ).  If it is 
too difficult for consumers to form reliable quality 
expectations, price premia may shrink to zero, 
even for products of high quality. 
 
• Consumers’ willingness to pay for quality     
insurance increases with the severity of the  
consequences associated with consuming poor 
quality.  Consumers are concerned about quality 
when consuming poor quality products results in a 
noticeable loss, either economical (the cost of the 
purchased product) or of other nature (an illness 
due to a contaminated product).  Consumer’s will-
ingness to pay for quality insurance is therefore 
low when buying an inexpensive wine, but high 
when purchasing a special bottle for an anniver-
sary. This implies that (at parity of research costs 
and quality), producers have more opportunities to 
capture reputation premia in markets for expensive 
goods, or when consuming poor quality may result 
in severe health consequences. 
 
• Private names, collective names and nested 
reputations.  Often, multiple names may refer to a 
single product.  For example, consumers may dif-
ferentiate wines by viticultural area, by winery, or 
by a particular vintage and grape variety.  Indeed, 
names can nest within each other to identify a 
product with increasing specificity.  Each of these 
names may develop its own reputation, leading to 
the establishment of private (e.g. winery) and col-
lective (e.g. viticultural area) reputations.  This 
distinction is relevant at two levels: 
 
1. The risk of free riding. A winery may lower 
costs by cutting on quality, and still obtain the 
price premium deriving from the collective 
reputation of the production region.  Research 
shows that when reputations are associated 
with collective names, free-riding may endan-
ger the long run reputation of a name (Winfree 
& McCluskey, 2005). 
 
2. Market-specific reputation structures. For con-
sumers, quality expectations referring to more 
specific names are more informative (i.e. pro-
vide better quality insurance), but they are also 
more costly to form. In general, consumers 
face higher research costs for more specific 
(generally private) names, and lower for aggre-
gate, less specific names (generally collective).  
Thus, for low-risk products reputations may 
form only on collective names (e.g. Idaho   
potatoes), as consumers may just not be inter-
ested in learning about individual firms. The 
wide price range observable in wine causes 
both private and collective reputations to play 
a relevant role in the wine market. 
 
• How can producers obtain and manage 
good reputations, and capture a premium in 
the market? Results from theoretical models 
(Costanigro & McCluskey, 2009) and empiri-
cal research (Costanigro et al., 2009) using 
California wine data (see Table 1) and quantile 
regression techniques show that, all other wine 
characteristics being equal: 
 
1. The average quality of the products marketed   
under a given name (collective or private) in 
the past is positively correlated with the price 
premium a name is able to capture (see Figure 
1). Good performance in the past is seen by 
consumers as a guarantee of future perform-
ance, and the greater the quality in the past, the 
larger the reputation price premium in the pre-
sent. 
 





























































Figure 1.  Variation in Price Premium due to a One Unit Increase in Average Past Quality.  
Estimates Calculated Across Wine Prices. Source: Costanigro et al., 2009. 
PRICE* SCORE FIRMPQ FIRMSD AVAPQ AVASD
N** 9261 9261 7717 6115 9074 8949
mean $37.18 86.54 86.65 2.36 86.25 3.50
min $6.05 60 62.00 0.00 74.67 0.00
p25 $19.76 84 85.00 1.53 85.42 3.14
p50 $27.12 87 87.00 2.19 86.24 3.49
p75 $39.78 89 88.48 2.98 87.68 3.86
max $2,140.00 99 96.63 14.14 91.00 7.78
Table 1: Wine Prices and Associated Tasting Scores, Firm Past Average Tasting 
Scores and Standard Deviation, Viticultural Area Past Average Tasting Scores and 
Standard Deviation. Descriptive Statistics, data collected from the Wine Spectator 
Magazine (1991-2000 issues).   
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2. Past average quality influences prices more than 
current quality.  Present quality performance,   
although positively correlated with higher price 
premia, has a smaller effect on it than past quality 
performance (see Figure 2).  This result highlights 
the  importance of reputations in markets for ex-
perience goods. 
 
3. Quality consistency (in the past) influences reputa-
tion premia.  The greater the variance in quality of 
the products marketed under a given name, the 
lower the price premium (see Figure 3).  When a 
name is associated with inconsistent quality it is 
harder (more expensive) for consumers to form 
quality expectations.  Furthermore, the name might 
be perceived as a riskier choice.  Both factors con-
tribute in reducing the price premium a name can 
capture. 
 
4. The history of a name matters.  While for new 
names quality expectations need to be formed from 
scratch, for most consumers the reputations of old 
names need only to be updated.  Thus, at parity of 
quality performance, old names can capture a lar-
ger share of consumers’ willingness to pay for 
quality insurance, because consumers need to 
search less when dealing with established names.  
This also holds, but with opposite effects, when a 
name earns a stigma rather than a good reputation.  
If a consumer has had a bad experience with a 
name, he or she may decide to avoid it in the     
future, even if quality improves overtime.  This is 
especially relevant when, like in the wine case, 
there are many names to choose from, and the cost 




• Knowing the reputation structure of a market is 
paramount. Reputation dynamics change across 
experience goods, and may also vary across the 
price range of a product.  When collective reputa-
tions play a relevant role, producers should con-
sider the adoption of policies to discourage free-
riding (e.g. by enforcing quality standards). 
 For the wine case, results show that collective 
names are most effective at capturing premia in the 
commercial (cheap) market segment, while winery 
names become more relevant for premium and  
ultra-premium wines.  Interestingly, collective 
reputation premia don’t disappear as wines become 
more expensive: while for inexpensive wines only 
collective reputations seem to matter, for expen-
sive ones both region and winery names are able to 
capture reputation premia.  This suggests a hierar-
chical selection process on the consumer side, who 
(when purchasing expensive wines) may use col-
lective reputations to limit the number of winery 
names on which to collect further more specific 
quality information. 
 
• For high quality producers, reducing research 
costs increases price premia.  Since reputation 
premia capture consumers’ willingness to pay for 
quality insurance net of research  
 costs, providing easy access to truthful and verifi-
able information on product quality will result in 
an increase of the price premium captured by high 
quality names.  In the wine market, such effect can 
be pursued with multiple instruments, such as    
reviews in specialized magazines, wine competi-
tions or informative advertisement.  Providing con-
sumers with an easy access to quality information 
also reduces the problem of free-riding, which 
plagues collective reputations: high quality pro-
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Figure 2.  An Increase in Average Past Quality is More Effective than Present Quality at Captur-



































Figure 3.  A Decrease in Past Quality Consistency by One Standard Deviation (i.e. Decreasing 
Consistency) Reduces Price Premia. Estimates Calculated Across Wine Prices. Source: Costanigro 
et al., 2009. 
